Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts STAR System
200809237H
SOAH DOCKET NO. 304-07-2936.26
CPA HEARING NO. 48,059
RE: **************
TAXPAYER NO.: **************
AUDIT OFFICE: **************
AUDIT PERIOD: June 1, 2001 THROUGH June 30, 2001
Limited Sales, Excise, And Use Tax/RDT
BEFORE THE COMPTROLLER
OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
SUSAN COMBS
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts
J.D. BOSTICK
Representing Tax Division
**************
Representing Petitioner
COMPTROLLER’S DECISION
************** (Petitioner) seeks redetermination of the assessment made by the
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (Comptroller) in connection to
Petitioner’s purchase of an airplane. The case was referred to the State
Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
gave notice of the intent to dispose of the case by summary disposition and the
parties expressed no objections. In this Proposal for Decision, the ALJ
recommends that the assessment be upheld.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY, NOTICE & JURISDICTION
Pursuant to a Texas Notification of Exam Results dated December 15, 2005, the
Comptroller assessed Petitioner tax, penalty, and interest. Petitioner timely
requested redetermination.
On September 10, 2007, by Order No. 5, ALJ Roy Scudday gave notice of his
intent to dispose of the case by summary disposition under 1 Texas
Administrative Code (TAC) 155.57(a). The parties were given deadlines to file
any objections and to provide a separate statement of all materials facts in
dispute. The record was set to close on October 29, 2007.
The case was thereafter transferred to ALJ Eleanor Kim. Petitioner is
represented by **************. The Comptroller was represented by Assistant
General Counsel Victor Simonds, but is now represented by Assistant General
Counsel Robin Robinson.
On October 1, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion for summary disposition stating
that he was entitled to a favorable decision as a matter of law, which the ALJ
treated as Petitioner’s agreement that summary disposition was appropriate.
Staff did not object to the ALJ’s intent to dispose of the case by summary
disposition. The record closed October 29, 2007, as scheduled.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Disposition Standard
If there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a party is entitled to
a decision in its favor as a matter of law, a case may be disposed of, in whole
or in part, by summary disposition pursuant to the rule at 1 TAC 155.57. The
type of proof that can be used to support a summary disposition includes
affidavits, pleadings, materials obtained by discovery, admissions, matters
officially noticed, stipulations, or evidence of record.
B. Facts
The following facts were established by the uncontroverted summary disposition
evidence:
On June 8, 2001, Petitioner purchased an aircraft styled Beech Bonanza A-36
(Serial Number **************) from COMPANY A. The aircraft bill of sale was
recorded with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on July 21, 2001, under
the registration number of **************. Petitioner’s address on the bill of
sale was **************, CITY A, Oklahoma.
COMPANY A delivered the aircraft to Petitioner in CITY B on June 8, 2001.
Petitioner used the aircraft three times on June 8, 2001 to travel within
Oklahoma: (1) from CITY B to CITY C and then back to CITY B; (2) from CITY B to
CITY A; and (3) from CITY A to CITY B and then back to CITY A. On June 8,
2001, Petitioner fueled the aircraft in CITY A and CITY B, and kept the
aircraft overnight at a hanger located in CITY A.
The aircraft was later flown into Texas. Petitioner has an office at
************** Airport, CITY D, Texas. Based on information obtained from the
FAA, the Comptroller assessed use tax against Petitioner and mailed the Texas
Notice of Exam Result to Petitioner at **************, CITY D, Texas. On
January 12, 2006, Petitioner responded to the notice disagreeing with the
assessment, and the letter reflected Petitioner’s address as **************,
CITY D, Texas.
C. Authorities, Arguments, and Analysis
When a person, who resides or is doing business in Texas, purchases tangible
personal property from outside the state and brings the item into Texas, the
purchaser is presumed to have purchased the item for storage, use, or
consumption in this state, and the purchaser is liable for use tax. [ENDNOTE:
(1)] Petitioner purchased a Beech Bonanza A-36 (the aircraft) outside of Texas
and used it for one day in Oklahoma before bringing the aircraft into Texas,
where Petitioner resides and has a place of business. Accordingly,
Petitioner’s purchase of the aircraft is subject to Texas use tax unless an
exemption applies. Petitioner claims an exemption. At issue here is whether
Petitioner’s purchase of the aircraft is exempt from Texas use tax under Tax
Code 151.328(a)(4), which provides that an aircraft is exempt from tax “if [the
aircraft] is sold to a person for use and registration in another state or
nation before any use in this state other than flight training in the aircraft
and the transportation of the aircraft out of this state.”
Petitioner contends that his facts fall squarely within Tax Code 151.328(a)(4)
because he used and registered the aircraft in Oklahoma before the aircraft was
used in Texas. Staff contends that the claimed exemption has no applicability
to Petitioner’s use tax case because Tax Code 151.328(a)(4) applies only to a
sales tax transaction. Staff argues that the Legislature’s intent to limit the
exemption applicability to a sale completed in Texas is evident by the language
“before any use in this state other than flight training in the aircraft and
the transportation of the aircraft out of this state.” According to Staff, a
sale that occurs outside of Texas would not require transportation out of
Texas.
In addition, Staff argues Petitioner’s position cannot be sustained under basic
principles of statutory interpretation. First, Staff argues that Petitioner’s
reading of the statute renders meaningless the phrase “other than flight
training in the aircraft and transportation of the aircraft out of this state.”
Second, an exemption must be strictly construed, which Staff contends is a
principle that Petitioner violates by reading the statute so broadly that it
encourages Texas residents to purchase airplanes from out-of-state sellers
rather than from Texas sellers. According to Staff, it is unreasonable to
construe the statute in a manner to find that the Texas Legislature
deliberately created an exemption that gives out-of-state sellers a competitive
advantage over Texas sellers. Staff argues that the converse is actually true
and cites STAR Accession No. 9707580L (July 22, 1997) as the Comptroller’s
recognition that the statute “was designed to level the playing field for Texas
aircraft vendors with those in other states.” Third, Staff points out that to
qualify for the exemption provided by Tax Code 151.328(a)(4), a taxpayer must
satisfy the requirements of Tax Code 151.328(f), which requires a person who
purchases an aircraft “in this state” to sign an exemption certificate. Staff
argues that the operation of the two statutes demonstrates the Legislature’s
clear intent to apply the exemption only to sales completed in Texas. Finally,
Staff refers to a recent amendment to Tax Code 151.328(a)(4), effective
September 1, 2007, as evidence that the Legislature clarified its intent that
the exemption is available only to in-state sales by exempting an aircraft sold
“... in this state to a person for use and registration in another state or
nation before any use in this state....” (Emphasis added). Staff asserts the
2007 adoption has significance and urges it be given weight.
Petitioner contends that Tax Code 151.328 exempts the sale of an aircraft from
taxes imposed by Chapter 151 of the Tax Code, which includes both sales and use
taxes. Petitioner argues that the Comptroller has already construed the
exemption as being applicable to both tax types, as reflected in 34 TAC
3.297(c)(9), which reads “Texas sales or use tax is not due on aircraft sold to
a person for use and registration in another state....” Petitioner emphasizes
the “use tax” reference in the rule. Moreover, Petitioner contends that the
Comptroller applied the exemption to a use tax transaction in Comptroller’s
Decision No. 39,806 (2001). In the hearing, the Comptroller addressed the
taxability of an aircraft that was purchased in Kansas, but registered in
Connecticut before the aircraft was brought into Texas. In rejecting the
taxpayer’s exemption claim, the Comptroller ruled that Tax Code 151.328(a)(4)
applies only if the aircraft was used and registered in the same state before
any Texas use. This interpretation, according to Petitioner, controls the
issue here. Unlike the taxpayer in Comptroller’s Decision No. 39,806,
Petitioner argues that he qualifies for the exemption because he both used and
registered the aircraft in Oklahoma before bringing the aircraft into Texas.
Petitioner dismisses Staff’s statutory construction arguments by contending
that under the plain reading of Tax Code 151.328(a)(4), the statute has two
parts, one that exempts an aircraft purchased for use and registration in
another state before any use in Texas, and another that exempts an aircraft
that is purchased in Texas for flight training in Texas and then transported
out of Texas. According to Petitioner, only the first part of the exemption
statute is applicable to his case. With respect to the exemption certificate
requirement of Tax Code 151.328(f), Petitioner’s position is that even though
the exemption applies to both sales and use taxes, only a person who purchases
an aircraft in Texas is required to issue the exemption ce
rtificate.
The parties’ dispute centers on whether Tax Code 151.328(a)(4) applies to sales
tax transactions only or whether it applies to both sales and use tax
transactions. Sales and use taxes are transactional taxes that involve a
seller and a purchaser. [ENDNOTE: (2)] Sales tax is due on each sale of a
taxable item in this state. [ENDNOTE: (3)] A sales tax transaction involves a
situation where both the seller and the purchaser are located in Texas. In
contrast, a use tax transaction involves an out-of-state seller, but the
purchaser resides or is doing business in Texas. Use tax is a tax on the
enjoyment of the item purchased. [ENDNOTE: (4)] As a result, use tax is due on
each taxable item brought into Texas for use, storage, and consumption.
[ENDNOTE: (5)] Use tax complements sales tax and serves to prevent the
avoidance of sales tax by requiring tax on items purchased outside of the
state. [ENDNOTE: (6)] Use tax places in-state retailers upon equal footing
with out-of-state sellers because a purchaser has no tax incentive to purchase
a taxable item from an out-of-state seller if the purchaser must pay use tax in
the same amount as sales tax. [ENDNOTE: (7)] The construction of Tax Code
151.328(a)(4) must be considered within this statutory context.
Sales and use taxes generally share the same tax exemptions. [ENDNOTE: (8)]
This is the origin of Petitioner’s argument that Tax Code 151.328(a)(4) applies
to both sales tax and use tax transactions. Staff argues that Tax Code
151.328(a)(4) is one of the few exemptions that applies only to sales tax
transactions. The initial difficulty faced by Staff is its inability to point
to a policy statement to support its position, whereas Petitioner relies on 34
TAC 3.297(c)(9) and Comptroller’s Decision No. 39,806. Staff relies on the
principles of statutory construction to argue what the Legislature intended in
enacting Tax Code 151.328(a)(4) and to argue that 34 TAC 3.297(c)(9) should not
be read to contravene the statute. Staff does not affirmatively address
Comptroller’s Decision No. 39,806, but based on its arguments related to 34 TAC
3.297(c)(9), the only inference that can be made is that Staff believes that
particular portion of the hearing decision should be ignored as an incorrect
interpretation of the statute.
Staff presents various statutory construction arguments, including the
contention that the Legislature’s 2007 amendment to the statute was a
clarification. Staff emphasizes that the adoption of the Comptroller’s
interpretation by the Legislature in 2007 demonstrates Petitioner’s
interpretation of Tax Code 151.328(a)(4) is incorrect, but this argument is the
least persuasive argument proffered by Staff. Even when the Legislature
expressly states that a statutory tax change is a clarification of existing
law, the court of appeals has ignored the express statement of intent when the
statute as written is subject to a different interpretation. [ENDNOTE: (9)] At
best, the court of appeals has given weight to the express statement of
clarification only after first ascertaining the statute’s meaning as written
and finding a consistency between the statute’s meaning and the express intent.
[ENDNOTE: (10)] The 2007 amendment relied on by Staff has a prospective
effective date without any express statement that the change was a
clarification. A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless
expressly made retrospective. [ENDNOTE: (11)] Accordingly, the 2007
legislation does not in any way bolster Staff’s position.
The 2007 amendment is not pertinent to the case at hand because it is the
statute as it existed at the time of the transaction which must be construed.
Ascertaining the Legislature’s intent should be from the language it used in
the statute. [ENDNOTE: (12)] Petitioner’s reading of Tax Code 151.328(a)(4) as
providing two separate exemptions is at odds with the Legislature’s use of the
phrase “other than” because it demonstrates that flight training is an
exception to the requirement of “before any use in Texas.” An exception makes
plain the intent that the two parts are related rather than discrete as argued
by Petitioner. The rejection of Petitioner’s statutory construction argument,
however, does not establish that Tax Code 151.328(a)(4) applies only to sales
tax transactions. In construing a statute, even an unambiguous one, the object
sought to be obtained, the legislative history, and the consequences of a
particular construction may be considered. [ENDNOTE: (13)] These factors will
be considered here to glean legislative intent.
The Legislature amended Tax Code 151.328(a)(4) to the version at issue in 1993,
by rewriting Tax Code 151.328(a)(3) (the predecessor statute) which provided an
exemption from tax for the sale of an aircraft “sold to a foreign government or
to persons who are not residents of this state.” A tax exemption statute
operates to exempt a transaction that is otherwise taxable. This legal
principle prompts the question as to what transactions involving a non-Texas
resident are subject to tax in Texas. A transaction between a non-Texas
resident and an out-of-state seller is not subject to Texas use tax because the
purchase is not for use, storage, or other consumption in Texas. Accordingly,
the predecessor exemption statute had no legal applicability to a use tax
transaction. To read the exemption statute as applying to a use tax
transaction would mean the Legislature exempted a transaction that was never
subject to Texas’ taxing authority in the first place. It is well established
that the Legislature does not do a useless thing. [ENDNOTE: (14)] A
transaction involving a non-Texas resident and in-state seller may be subject
to Texas sales tax. However, a taxable item that is shipped by an in-state
seller to a location outside the state is exempt from tax, [ENDNOTE: (15)] so
as in the use tax scenario, the predecessor statute has no relevancy to this
sales tax scenario. The remaining transaction is the transaction where the
non-Texas resident purchases a taxable item from an in-state seller and takes
physical possession of the item in Texas. A taxable sale occurs when title or
possession of tangible personal property is transferred for consideration in
Texas. [ENDNOTE: (16)] This taxable sale is what the Legislature intended to
exempt under the pre-1993 exemption statute. By exempting in-state sales
between a Texas seller and a non-Texas resident, the Legislature eliminated the
tax burden on a non-Texas resident who purchased an airplane from a Texas
seller. Rather than enforcing use tax against out-of-state
sellers to even the playing field for Texas sellers, which is the purpose of
the use tax, the Legislature instead granted an exemption to encourage
non-Texas residents to come into Texas to buy airplanes from Texas sellers. It
is consistent with the Comptroller’s statement in STAR Accession No. 9707580L
that the exemption was designed to level the playing field for Texas aircraft
vendors. The 1997 taxability letter refers to the 1993 version of the statute,
indicating that the Comptroller views the 1993 statute and the pre-1993 statute
as serving the same purpose.
The pre-1993 exemption statute placed no limit on the use of the aircraft in
Texas. Under the literal reading of the statute as it existed then, a
non-Texas resident was able to purchase an aircraft in Texas and use it in
Texas for awhile without losing the tax exemption. Effective October 1, 1993,
the Legislature amended the statute to the version at issue. Based on the
plain wording of the statute, it is evident that the Legislature intended to
narrow the exemption to exclude a non-resident who uses the aircraft in Texas
from qualifying for the exemption unless the use involves only flight training
before transporting it outside the state. [ENDNOTE: (17)] The 1993 amendment
left intact the applicability of the exemption to sales tax transactions as
evidenced by the Legislature’s contemporaneous enactment of Tax Code 151.328(f)
with Tax Code 151.328(a)(4). To qualify for the exemption provided under Tax
Code 151.328(a)(4), Tax Code 151.328(f) requires that “the person purchasing
the aircraft in this state must sign at the time of purchase an exemption
certificate” that contains the following content:
(1) is designated as an exemption certificate for the purchase of an aircraft
for out-of-state registration and use;
(2) is on a form designated by the comptroller;
(3) contains all information the comptroller considers reasonable;
(4) is signed by the purchaser at the time of the purchase; and
(5) provides that purchaser, by signing the certificate, authorizes the
comptroller to provide a copy of the certificate to the state or nation of
intended use and registration.
Generally, statutes concerning the same subject matter are harmonized, if
possible, to give effect to all. [ENDNOTE: (18)] With respect to Tax Code
151.328(a)(4) and 151.328(f), the Legislature has mandated it by expressly
tying the two statutes for the operation of the exemption. In Tax Code
151.328(f), the Legislature stated that the certificate must be signed by the
purchaser who buys an aircraft “in this state” indicating clearly that
Legislature intended to exempt sales completed in Texas. The statutory content
requirements of the exemption certificate further demonstrate that the
Legislature contemplated that the purchased aircraft would be taken out of
Texas, reinforcing the view of an in-state sales. Petitioner argues that the
Legislature intended to apply the requirement of Tax Code 151.328(f) to
in-state sales, but he offered no rationale as to why the Legislature would
require an exemption certificate be issued to in-state sellers and not to
out-of-state sellers who hold Texas sales and use tax permits and who are
legally required to collect Texas use tax. [ENDNOTE: (19)] There is no
rationale other than the fact the exemption is intended only for sales tax
transactions, as demonstrated by its history and the statutory context of the
exemption.
Petitioner relies on 34 TAC 3.297(c)(9) and Comptroller’s Decision No. 39,806,
as evidence of existing Comptroller’s interpretation. The rule found at 34 TAC
3.297(c)(9) provides that no sales or use tax is due, and the statement is not
inaccurate. No use tax is due on a person who purchases an aircraft outside of
Texas and brings it into Texas for flight training and then leaves Texas after
the training. The general statement that no use tax is due cannot be read to
extend the exemption of Tax Code 151.328(a)(4) beyond what was intended by the
Legislature, nor can it be used to ignore the requirements of Tax Code
151.328(f). In Comptroller’s Decision No. 39,806, the Comptroller suggested a
use tax transaction can be exempt under Tax Code 151.328(a)(4) if the use and
registration occurred in the same state before any use in Texas. The
interpretation articulated in Comptroller’s Decision No. 39,806 is not
consistent with the statute, which applies only to sales tax transactions for
the reasons noted above. The ALJ concludes that Comptroller’s Decision No.
39,806, though correct in its ultimate rejection of the exemption claim,
erroneously interpreted Tax Code 151.328(a)(4). Taxpayers do not have vested
rights to the continuation of an erroneous policy. [ENDNOTE: (20)] Staff’s
position taken in this case is consistent with statute and facilitates
legislative intent.
Petitioner purchased a taxable item for use, storage, or other consumption in
Texas. There is no applicable exemption to exempt the purchase from tax.
Therefore, the ALJ concludes that under 1 TAC 155.57, Staff is entitled to a
decision in its favor as a matter of law. The ALJ recommends that the
assessment be upheld without changes.
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. ************** (Petitioner) purchased an airplane from COMPANY A
(**************).
2. The Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (Comptroller) assessed Petitioner
for tax, penalty, and interest in connection to Petitioner’s purchase of the
airplane.
3. Petitioner requested redetermination, and the case was referred to the State
Office of Administrative Hearings.
4. On May 23, 2007, Staff provided a notice of hearing to Petitioner.
5. The notice of hearing contained the date, the time, and a statement of the
nature of the hearing; a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction
under which the hearing was to be held; a reference to the particular sections
of the statutes and rules involved; and a short, plain statement of the matters
asserted.
6. On September 10, 2007, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Roy Scudday issued an
order stating his intent to dispose of the case by summary disposition and gave
the parties the opportunity to file objections and a statement of disputed
facts. The record was scheduled to close on October 29, 2007.
7. The file was transferred to ALJ Eleanor Kim.
8. The parties did not object to disposing of the case by summary disposition.
9. The record closed on October 29, 2007, as scheduled.
10. COMPANY A is located outside of Texas.
11. On June 8, 2001, Petitioner accepted the delivery of the airplane from
COMPANY A in Oklahoma and used the airplane for three short trips within
Oklahoma on the same day before hangaring it in Oklahoma.
12. Petitioner registered the airplane in Oklahoma.
13. Petitioner brought the airplane into Texas.
14. Petitioner resides in Texas and has a place of business in Texas.
15. Petitioner purchased the airplane for use, storage, or other consumption in
Texas.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Comptroller has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. ch. 111.
2. The State Office of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over matters
related to the hearing in this matter, including the authority to issue a
proposal for decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. ch. 2003.
3. The Comptroller provided proper and timely notice of the hearing pursuant to
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. ch. 2001 and TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 111.009.
4. An administrative law judge may issue a proposal for decision or other order
resolving a contested case without an evidentiary hearing if a party files a
motion for summary disposition or if the administrative law judge issues a
notice of intent to dispose of the case by summary disposition. 1 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE 155.57.
5. Use tax is imposed on the storage, use, or other consumption in this state
of tangible personal property purchased from a retailer for storage, use, or
other consumption in this state. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 151.101(a).
6. Tangible personal property that is shipped or brought into Texas by a
purchaser is presumed to have been purchased from a retailer for storage, use,
or consumption in Texas. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 151.105.
7. The purchaser storing, using, or consuming tangible personal property in
this state is liable for use tax under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 151.102(a).
8. Based on Findings of Fact Nos 1, 10, and 13 - 15 and Conclusions of Law Nos.
5 - 7, Petitioner is liable for use tax on the airplane brought into Texas for
use, storage, or consumption unless an exemption applies.
9. Petitioner has the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
he is eligible for the claimed exemption. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 1.40(2)(A).
10. The exemption claimed by Petitioner under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 151.328(a)(4)
applies only to sales tax transactions. Petitioner’s transaction was a use tax
transaction, so he cannot by law establish an entitlement to the claimed
exemption.
11. Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
assessment should be upheld.
Hearing No. 48,059
ORDER OF THE COMPTROLLER
On November 9, 2007 the State Office of Administrative Hearings’ Administrative
Law Judge, Eleanor H. Kim, issued a Proposal for Decision in the above
referenced matter to which Taxpayer filed Exceptions on November 26, 2007. The
Tax Division filed a Reply to Exceptions on December 3, 2007. The Comptroller
has considered the Exceptions, Reply and the ALJ’s recommendation letter and
determined that the ALJ’s decision should be adopted without change and this
decision represents the ruling thereon.
The above decision resulting in Taxpayer's liability as set out in “Attachment
A,” which is incorporated by reference, is approved and adopted in all
respects. The decision becomes final twenty days after the date Petitioner
receives notice of this decision, and the total sum of the tax, penalty, and
interest amounts is due and payable within twenty days thereafter. If such sum
is not paid within such time, an additional penalty of ten percent of the taxes
due will accrue, and interest will continue to accrue. If either party desires
a rehearing, that party must file a Motion for Rehearing, which must state the
grounds for rehearing, no later than twenty days after the date Petitioner
receives notice of this decision. Notice of this decision is presumed to occur
on the third day after the date of this decision.
Signed on this 24th day of September 2008.
SUSAN COMBS
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts
by: Martin A. Hubert
Deputy Comptroller
ENDNOTE(S):
(1) TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 151.101, 151.102 and 151.105.
(2) Calvert v. Canteen, 371 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1963).
(3) TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 151.051.
(4) Bullock v. Lone Star Gas Co., 567 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1978).
(5) TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 151.101.
(6) Bullock v. Foley Bros. Drys Goods Corp., 802 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App. - Austin
1990, writ denied).
(7) Id.
(8) TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 151.301.
(9) Rylander v. Fisher Control, 45 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App. - Austin, 2001, no
pet.).
(10) Sergeant Enterprises, Inc. v. Strayhorn, 112 S.W.3d 241 (Tex. App. -
Austin, 2003, no pet.).
(11) TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 311.022.
(12) Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. 2000).
(13) USAA v. Strayhorn, 124 S.W.3d 722 (Tex. App. - Austin 2003, pet denied).
(14) TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 311.021(3).
(15) TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 151.330(a).
(16) TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 151.005(1) and 151.051.
(17) Apparently, the term “non-resident” was replaced with “a person for use
and registration in another state” to address the Comptroller’s prior concerns
in determining residency status of a legal entity that purchased an aircraft.
Comptroller’s Decision No. 16,318 (1987) and STAR Accession No. 8403L0559C03
(March 14, 1984).
(18) TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 311.026(a).
(19) TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 151.103, 151.106, and 151.107.
(20) Grocers Supply Co. v. Sharp, 978 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. App. - Austin 1998, pet
denied).
ACCESSION NUMBER: 200809237H
SUPERSEDED: N
DOCUMENT TYPE: H
DATE: 09/24/2008
TAX TYPE: SALES